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This paper examines Mykhail Semenko’s Futurist manifestos that developed an opposition 
between “national” and “international” art, and specifically called “national” art provincial and 
retrograde. In promoting the international European avant-garde, Semenko’s essays demonstrate 
how consistently he championed a contemporary and modern Ukrainian culture in the face of 
home-grown conservatism.
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This paper is about Ukrainian Futurism as a form of aesthetic and cultural dissent within the 
Ukrainian national revolution. I approach the revolution not just as the political events of 1917 but 
as an extended social and cultural process that had earlier roots. The discussion is limited to texts 
by Mykhail Semenko, the founder of Ukrainian Futurism: the first two are from 1914 and a third 
is from 1927. The purpose is to explore how Ukrainian Futurism targeted the “national” category 
for criticism at a time when Ukrainians were struggling to create a national culture and state.1
During Futurism’s heyday and in years later, mainstream Ukrainian critics and writers 
interpreted the Futurist attack on the “national” category as anti-Ukrainian. It was, in fact, 
a well-intentioned, internal critique of Ukrainian culture. The disconnect between Semenko 
and his contemporaries lay in the fact that he saw art (and specifically the avant-garde) as 
a  quintessentially international process —  not a national phenomenon. In fact, Ukrainian 
Futurism (like the Italian and Russian movements) went a step further and viewed the national 
tradition as an impediment to innovation, and by extension to a modern Ukrainian culture. 
Unlike most of Futurism’s adversaries in the cultural field, Ukrainian Futurism did not seek to 
restore or recover anything in the old culture (be it European or Ukrainian); it was dedicated 
to creating new art and new values through an intramural struggle with Ukrainian conservative 
1 The current paper draws on aspects of my book: Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, Ukrainian Futurism, 1914–1930: 
A Historical and Critical Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). It was first 
presented at a conference on “Ukrainian Statehood 1917–1921: Institutions and Individuals,” Columbia 
University, Harriman Institute, on February 25, 2017.
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cultural forces. It wanted a Ukrainian cultural revolution, not a “national” art. The movement 
espoused endless artistic change or permanent cultural revolution.2
One of the important questions for Ukraine, just before and after 1917, came down to the 
following: How, on what basis, and through what kind of cultural practices was the Ukrainian 
nation and Ukrainianness (ukrainstvo) to be institutionalized in the modern era?
From approximately 1900 to 1927 a variety of answers proliferated. There is no denying that 
the older populist ideal of creating a culture of and in the service of the “people,” which defined 
the second half of the 19th century, began giving way at the end of that century to the notion 
of a “high” Ukrainian culture, a culture of and by the intelligentsia, a phenomenon that was 
crystalized by Ukrainian Modernism. The level of social engagement demanded from the artist 
had begun to wane, while the demand for high quality artistic artefacts increased. Ukrainian 
culture/literature was beginning to take shape as a self-conscious national institution, with the 
ambition of competing with analogous national European institutions, and, at long last, taking 
the place of Russian imperial culture. At this stage, artists were vying more and more for the 
attention of cultural connoisseurs and less and less for the attention of the masses. The function 
of art was defined by its ability to represent the nation with its finest works rather than by its 
patriotic or social message. The pursuit of beauty, of formal innovation, of art for art’s sake, and 
the growing autonomy of the artist in society (including women writers and their gendered 
themes) was a major turning point in Ukrainian cultural life just before the revolution.
These transformations created anxiety not only among the populists and realists, but 
also among some Modernist adherents of the cult of beauty. There was a sense that art and 
literature might be in danger of becoming socially and politically irrelevant, and lose its 
Ukrainian authenticity. The Ukrainian national revolution, both as something anticipated and 
then, suddenly, as a reality, required, in the eyes of these people, a “national” art and literature. 
Tradition, cultural roots, connection to the people —  these were some of the criteria that defined 
“national” art. In short, the “Europeanization” of Ukrainian letters —  a major achievement of the 
Modernist period —  was beginning to be perceived as a potential danger to the development of 
a uniquely Ukrainian literature and culture.
Into this creative but tense intellectual climate entered Mykhail Semenko with his Futurism 
in 1914. As I have noted, Ukrainian literature had seen sharp debates on the issue of the new art 
before Semenko’s time. “Moloda muza” had inspired hot polemics and opinions; Serhii Yefremov 
was outraged by the new Modernist trends; Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi decried decadence; Ivan 
Franko debated Mykola Voronyi and scolded him for his aestheticism. In addition, Ukrainians 
were aware of the artistic debates in Europe, including those that had taken place in the Russian 
empire. Still, nothing prepared the Ukrainian reader and writer for Semenko’s Futurist manifesto, 
“Sam” (I Alone), which appeared in Kyiv in February 1914. What is interesting to note in the quote 
below is how Semenko depicts the current Ukrainian cultural condition, how he characterizes 
his audience, and the artistic standards that rule Ukrainian society. His statement is social but 
in an aggressive and transgressive way.
2 For details, see Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, Ukrainian Futurism, 1914–1930: A Historical and Critical Study 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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I Alone
Hey, man, listen here! Listen here, I say. You’re really strange, man. I’d like to 
tell you a few things about art and about things that relate to it, just a few 
words. Nothing can be better than talking with you about art, man. I clutch 
my sides and laugh. I reel with laughter. Your appearance is strange, man! 
Oh, you’re funny as hell. Ah, it’s terribly boring to be with you… I don’t want 
to talk to you. You raise your greasy Kobzar and say: here is my art. Man, I’m 
embarrassed for you… You bring me debased ‘ideas’ about art and it makes 
me sick. Man, art is something you haven’t even dreamt of. I want to tell 
you, that where there is a cult, there is no art. And most importantly, it [art] 
doesn’t fear attack. Quite the contrary. It is strengthened when attacked. But 
you’ve latched on to your Kobzar, which smells of wagon grease and lard, 
and you think that your reverence will protect it. Your reverence has killed it 
and there is no way to resurrect it. Who is enthusiastic about it [the Kobzar] 
now? Primitive men, precisely of your type, who read [the newspaper] Rada 
[Council]. Man, time turns Titans into worthless Lilliputians, and their 
place now is in the annals of scholarly institutions. Living among you, one 
falls decades behind the times. I don’t accept that type of art. How can 
I revere Shevchenko [the author of the 1840 Kobzar], when I see that he 
is under my feet? I can’t pull veins of reverence from my body for months 
at a time the way you do for a man who, because he is a contemporary 
factor, is [therefore] a deeply repulsive phenomenon. Man, I want to tell 
you that right now, as I write this, I find it loathsome to pick up our papers. 
If I don’t tell you what’s on my mind, then I’ll suffocate in the atmosphere 
of your ‘sincere’ Ukrainian art. I wish it would die. Such is your jubilee 
celebration. That’s all there is left of Shevchenko. But, neither can I avoid 
my own celebration.
I burn my Kobzar.3
Let us reflect on what Semenko declared.
First, we should recall that 1914 marked the 100th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko’s birth, 
Ukraine’s national poet, an event the Russian empire discouraged from being celebrated. For 
Semenko, however, the subject is clearly and unmistakably “Art” (as an institution) and its status 
in Ukraine. According to him, Ukraine has a cult and ritual veneration, but no real art. This is 
not Shevchenko’s fault, it is society’s. Semenko’s addressee is a ludicrous man who elicits both 
amusement and depression. The Kobzar, which is soiled from handling (but not necessarily 
reading) is put forth by the primitive man as the current definition and formula for art. Semenko 
is embarrassed by the argument.
But what is “Art,” according to Semenko? It is a process tempered through struggle and 
polemics; an attack like Semenko’s on Shevchenko is, by definition, meant to create space for 
3 Mykhail Semenko, Derzannia. Poemy [Bravado. Poems] (Kyiv: Kvero, 1914), 1.
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a new art. The cult killed the Kobzar, which was the definition of art in an earlier era. Jubilee 
celebrations are all that is left of Shevchenko —  who is no longer an artist but a cult figure.
Semenko links the man with primitive artistic instincts to the newspaper Rada (published 
in Kyiv between September 1906 to August 1914) and the Ukrainian periodic press in general, 
creating an expansive picture of social and cultural stagnation.
The factor of time and, more specifically, the idea of progress plays an important role in 
Semenko’s argument: he says, that the passage of time turns giants into midgets; Shevchenko, 
a former giant, now belongs in the annals of learned societies; Semenko, as a Ukrainian, finds 
himself in danger of falling behind the times within his milieu. Shevchenko is a repulsive 
phenomenon because he continues to be a present-day artistic authority for many people. 
Semenko finds himself suffocating in this atmosphere of “sincere Ukrainian art”: he wants to 
see it dead, so he can survive as an artist.
Finally, Semenko celebrates the Shevchenko jubilee by burning the grubby Kobzar, 
the emblem of the cult. This gesture could be read as a liberation of Shevchenko from a cult, in 
which his Kobzar serves a holy book instead of literature. By not showing reverence, by attacking 
the cult, Semenko frees Shevchenko as a literary “giant.”
Some of these ideas were reiterated in a less incendiary form in Semenko’s publication 
Kvero-futuryzm (March 1914), where he draws an explicit link between “national” artistic practices 
and lack of innovation.
We desire, by conscious means [shtuchnym rukhom], to bring our art 
closer to those frontiers of universal art where a new era is beginning. At 
the very least, art should be in step with Life, but now it is falling behind. 
And our Ukrainian art is so shamefully retrograde in its vulgar routine and 
slavish mustiness that it is not deserving of the name… [Art] can neither 
be Ukrainian nor anything else… National traits in art are a sign of its 
backwardness.4
Semenko’s contemporaries clearly did not read his 1914 manifestos in the light he might 
have intended. His style was an impediment to a calm reception and the political situation in 
the Russian Empire made everyone highly sensitive to “national” issues. I will not recapitulate 
here the hysterical reaction by the critics of the journal Ukrainska khata (specifically Mykyta 
Sriblianskyi and Mykola Yevshan), who called Semenko an idiot and a national traitor.5 What is 
of interest to us is their need to justify “sincere Ukrainian art.” In response to Semenko’s call for 
an international orientation, Yevshan declared: “A new creativity, well and good. But on what 
foundation (na yakomu grunti)?” 6 He then affirmed a “national” orientation, maintaining that 
little was gained by following “European fashions.” Sriblianskyi concurred: “We had all the most 
fashionable products of Europe, we discussed [her] wisest words, but our Ukrainian cause —  
4 Mykhail Semenko, Kvero-futuryzm. Poezopisni [Quero-Futurism. Poem-Songs] (Kyiv: Kvero, 1914), 1–2.
5 For details, see Ilnytzkyj, Ukrainian Futurism, 3–27.
6 Mykola Yevshan, “‘Suprema Lex.’ Slovo pro kulturu ukrainskoho slova [‘Suprema Lex.’ A Word about 
the Culture of the Ukrainian Word],” Ukrainska khata 3–4 (1914): 271.
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‘weeps like an orphan by the Dnipro.’” 7 Yevshan glanced at the modern writings and sighed: “It 
is a pity that there is no one who might defend the Ukrainian creative idea.” 8 He elaborated:
This then is precisely the problem: the Ukrainian creative idea has begun to 
chase electric lamps, not having learned to examine life properly in the light 
of a gas lamp. The blinding light has had a bad effect on the eyes and they 
squint and cannot see the “nearest of objects.” The “nearest of objects” in 
literature is the culture of the native word, that natural soil without which 
every creative work must emerge stunted and useless. … Let us reach for 
that beauty which contains the soul and thoughts of the Ukrainian people!! 9
Despite his revolutionary manifestos of 1914, Semenko completely missed out on the initial 
year of the revolution itself. With the outbreak of WWI, he was drafted into the Tsarist army and 
sent to the Far East, finding himself in places like Vladivostok, Harbin, Suchan (later known as 
Partizansk). He arrived in Ukraine only in December 1917, spending a few months in his native 
Kybyntsi (Poltava region), appearing in Kyiv in April 1918, when Hetman Skoropadskyi was 
assuming control. He became immediately active in literary and cultural life, publishing poetry 
and reviews, siding mostly with people close to the leftist Borotbist movement. With the advent 
of Soviet power, Semenko was chosen to become the editor of the very first Soviet Ukrainian 
art and literature periodical Mystetstvo (May to July 1919). He was briefly placed under arrest in 
August 1919 by Denikin’s forces on suspicion of being a member of the communist party.
The history of Ukrainian Futurism during the 1920s is complex, with the greatest successes 
coming in the latter part of the decade. For our purposes, it will suffice to jump to the year 
1927 when Semenko published Bumeranh (Boomerang), a collection of essays by fellow avant-
gardists, among which was one of his own dedicated to the perils of nationalism in art. It was 
titled: “Reflections About Why Ukrainian Nationalism is Bad for Ukrainian Culture, or, Why 
Internationalism is Good for It.” This was an argument for an art that would have significance 
beyond the borders of Ukrainian national culture and, by extension, a critique of those who 
might be “pleased by the [current] parameters of Ukrainian culture.” 10 The essay once again 
painted an image of a retrograde Ukrainian culture precisely because it limited its horizons to 
the “national.”
How did Semenko define “nationalism” and “internationalism”?
Ukrainian nationalism (he also uses the word “chauvinism”) is equated with khutorianstvo 
and malorosiianstvo: the first implying parochialism and narrow-mindedness; the second 
literally meaning “Little Russianness,” hinting at a subordinate cultural relationship to Russia, 
7 Mykyta Sriblianskyi, “Etiud pro futuryzm [An Etude about Futurism],” Ukrainska khata 6 (1914): 463.
8 Yevshan, “‘Suprema Lex,’” 272.
9 Yevshan, “‘Suprema Lex,’” 277.
10 Semenko, Mykhail, “Mirkuvannia pro te, chym shkidlyvyi ukrainskyi natsionalizm dlia ukrainskoi 
kultury, abo chym korysnyi internatsionalizm dlia nei zh [Reflections about Why Ukrainian 
Nationalism is Bad for Ukrainian Culture, or, Why Internationalism is Good for It],” Bumeranh 1 
(1927): 4, 5. On the history of Bumeranh, see Ilnytzkyj, Ukrainian Futurism, 109–15. 
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or an immature form of Ukrainianness. The problem with “nationalism,” says Semenko is that it 
“Locks us into a circle of provincial interests, ideas and preferences” and distorts the very idea of 
“Europe.” He emphasizes: “Every ‘European’ idea and novelty, [when] filtered through this type 
of parochialism, hangs on the neck of Ukrainian culture, like last year’s shawl, and ‘Europe’ fits 
[Ukrainian culture] about as much as the words ‘merci’ and ‘pardon’ in the novels or feuilletons 
of [Mykola] Khvyliovyi and Arkadii Liubchenko…” 11
The manifestations of parochialism in Ukraine take several forms. Semenko enumerates the 
fondness for Ukrainian choirs (“Dumka”); the cult of Shevchenko (with his portraits covered in 
traditional ritual cloths, i. e., rushnyky); and Marxist worker and peasant organizations like “Hart” 
and “Pluh.” “In short, every simplification of culture regardless of its [political] color, including 
the Red and ending with the Proletarian.” 12 He also mentions the Ivan Franko Theatre (Teatr 
im. Franka), the Ukrainian Opera, and the many cultural societies named in honour of Mykola 
Leontovych. He calls all this disdainfully: Europe a la Ukraine (evropeiske po-ukraisnky).13 Turning 
to his readers, he says:
As you can see, your Ukraine is rather sad… If we remain satisfied with these 
parameters of Ukrainian culture, make them the starting point, defend 
them and elaborate on them, plus dress them up in some coherent theory, 
add an appropriate superstructure, then we will arrive at that nationalism 
that leads toward our native parochialism (ridnoho khutorianstva); [we will 
have] a provincial “Europeanism” for the underprivileged. Needless to say, 
those who are trying to build a proletarian culture with this baggage face 
an unenviable task.14
For Semenko, nationalism and chauvinism is ultimately any movement in Soviet Ukrainian 
culture that refuses to go beyond “purely national creative preoccupations” or, as he cleverly also 
puts it, any phenomena that is not “digested by the native gut” (shcho vykhodyt z pevnykh mezh 
chysto-natsionalnykh tvorchykh kompleksiv i ne peretravlene v ridnomu shlunkovi).15 Nationalism 
is a movement that does not “support what is innovative in culture,” and expects “to build the 
culture of the proletariat by using the folksong.” 16
When it came to identifying, what was “international” in Ukrainian culture, Semenko, 
naturally, listed all forms of Ukrainian Futurism, past and present, including his closest associates 
Mykola Bazhan, Geo Shkurupii, Oleksa Slisarenko, the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Directorate 
(VUFKU, Vseukrainske Foto Kino Upravlinnia), where he had worked a few years earlier. These 
people and institutions “…stand unwaveringly on the positions of internationalism, changing 
the direction of Ukrainian culture, [and are] in constant struggle with home-grown symbolism, 
11 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 3.
12 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 4.
13 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 4.
14 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 4–5.
15 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 7.
16 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 8.
Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj. Cultural Revolution: Mykhail Semenko, 
Ukrainian Futurism and the “National” Category
51
aestheticism, and attempts to canonize academism, under all kinds of slogans.” 17 Les Kurbas was 
also singled out as someone whose theatrical work went well beyond “not only the theatre as 
such, but beyond the boundaries of national culture.” 18 “[T]his international current in Ukrainian 
culture, moving within the coordinates of national culture with all its reactionary elements, has 
broken through into universal (svitovykh) productive and creative pursuits.” These were the only 
Ukrainian forces that were part of a “general global offensive” capable of defining the “future” 
(v zahalno-svitovomu nastupi na maibutnie). These have “roots in an international source” and 
are in “dialectical” struggle with the “national environment” (natsionalnym otochenniam); in 
other words, they are engaged in an “intracultural struggle” (vnutrikulturna borotba).19 Semenko 
summarizes:
It is necessary to strenuously and seriously promote organic progressive 
processes in our culture, for it is not through squandering of the old but 
through the creation of new values that we will arrive not only in the “real 
Europe,” but essentially [achieve] proletarian culture.20
Toward the end of the article, Semenko attributes much of what is negative in the Ukrainian 
cultural process (that is, the “suppression” of “experimental and innovative currents that are 
inevitably and organically tied to a global, intercultural, and international movement”) to politics, 
namely, to “certain abnormalities of our leadership” (zavdiaky de-yakym nenormalnostiam 
kerivnytstva).21
Ukrainian Futurism fits rather neatly into the general framework of “revolution.” It set out to 
modernize Ukrainian culture through shock therapy, using, among other things, the medium of 
scandal —  a dramatic, almost violent act that involved toppling the national Shevchenko cult. 
The salvos fired in 1914 were directed at the past and in the name of the future. Like a revolution, 
Futurism saw part of its burden in the destruction of the status quo, which in this case meant 
undermining the comfort zone of readers and writers. If for some intellectuals, the Ukrainian 
revolution and Ukraine’s liberation implied recapturing or re-establishing some purported 
Ukrainian national essence or authenticity, what Anthony Smith called “the ‘reconstruction’ of 
the nation,” which he labeled “a species of salvation drama… based on a mythology of origins, 
efflorescence, decline and renewal,” 22 Semenko, on the other hand, tried to clear the ground for 
a completely new Ukrainianness, based on the foundations of the international avant-garde. A 
charismatic and fearless leader, he was one of those “devoured,” to paraphrase Jacques Mallet 
du Pan, by a Revolution that rejected not only a “modern” Ukraine but also a “national” one. The 
17 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 5.
18 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 5.
19 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 6.
20 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 8–9.
21 Semenko, “Mirkuvannia,” 9.
22 Anthony D. Smith, “When is a Nation?” Geopolitics 7.2 (2002): 6.
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ultimate irony is that Semenko was executed by firing squad on 24 October 1937 —  having been 
accused of Ukrainian nationalism.
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